AGAINST QUASI-FIDEISM
Jeroen de Ridder

Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the
epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application
of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among
its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a
matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally
grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.

1. Introduction
In a number of recent papers, Duncan Pritchard ventures to carve out a
novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism.1
It is inspired by Wittgenstein’s 1969 On Certainty and, indirectly, by John
Henry Newman’s 1870 An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Quasi-fideism’s advertised attractions are legion. It can do justice both to
the idea that religious belief can be epistemically rational and also that
it is at bottom held on arational faith. It instantiates a more general and
independently plausible epistemological framework. As a result, it not
only inherits the benefits of this framework, but it also allows for a parity
argument which shows that many critics of religious belief are unfairly
holding religious beliefs to higher epistemic standards than ordinary
belief. The general framework of which quasi-fideism is an instance is
anti-skeptical, preserves plausible epistemic transmission principles, and
avoids epistemic relativism.
Reflecting on this list, you might well think that quasi-fideism is too
good to be true. In this paper, I argue that you would be right. I will first
present quasi-fideism and explain how it is supposed to have the benefits
indicated above. I will then raise objections to all three of quasi-fideism’s
key tenets.
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2. Quasi-Fideism
The rationality of theistic religious belief is precarious. It’s not a given that
belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good supernatural being
can be rational for intellectually responsible modern people. In fact, many
have argued that it cannot.2 Typical responses to this charge come in two
sorts. On the one hand, there is fideism, the claim that religious belief is
not subject to the canons of rationality. It is a matter of blind faith and is,
as such, beyond rational evaluation. Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and D. Z.
Philips are associated with this idea.3 On the other hand, some claim that
there is rational backing for religious belief, either in the form of experience-like grounds4 or of publicly available reasons and arguments.5
Both options suffer from well-documented problems.6 The former puts
religious beliefs outside the sphere of rational discourse and hence immunizes it from rational criticism. This does not only seem undesirable and
implausible, it also makes it mysterious why anyone would have religious
beliefs or faith, at least from a purely cognitive perspective. Moreover,
it reeks of special pleading: what’s so different about religious beliefs to
render them exempt from rational evaluation? The problem for the second
sort of response is that it is controversial whether the rational backing
that religious belief is supposed to possess is strong enough to withstand
criticisms that are leveled against it and whether it really outweighs anti-theistic evidence. The jury is still out on this, but both religious believers
and atheists have had a hard time convincing each other that the support
for their beliefs is strong enough to demand wide assent.
Quasi-fideism steers a middle course between these options. It attempts
to appropriate the benefits of both, while avoiding their problems. Consider the following two seemingly conflicting observations. First, religious
people’s core beliefs—such as the belief that God exists—are very stable
and don’t respond to rational considerations in the way more mundane
beliefs do. Belief in God is psychologically stable: people don’t just suspend
it when they encounter rational criticisms as they might with other beliefs.
Belief in God is also doxastically stable: it acts as a fulcrum to evaluate which
objections to it must be taken seriously and which can be rejected.7 Core
religious beliefs constitute part of a person’s worldview. Second, more
specific religious beliefs often do appear to be held in a paradigmatically
2
Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism; Sobel, Logic and Theism; Oppy, Arguing about Gods;
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Philipse, God in the Age of Science. Several popular-scientific books also belabor this conclusion (Dawkins, God Delusion; Dennett, Breaking the Spell; Hitchens, God Is Not Great; Stenger,
God), but their argumentative rigor is, to say the least, not always up to snuff.
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epistemically rational manner. Many religious believers are intelligent,
well-informed, and there is nothing wrong with their cognitive functioning. Reflective believers can cite reasons or other grounds for their
beliefs and revise them in light of new things they learn. An acceptable
epistemology of religious belief, then, should show how religious beliefs
can be rationally evaluable.
Quasi-fideism takes its cue from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.8
Hinge epistemology holds that rational evaluation is necessarily local in
the sense that it can only happen within a framework that holds fixed
a number of so-called hinges: commitments that cannot be supported
further and cannot coherently be doubted. Since these commitments
constitute the framework for rational evaluation, they are not themselves
rationally evaluable.9 Thus Wittgenstein:
The questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which
those turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.10

Quasi-fideism’s central proposal is that we ought to think of the existence
of God as a hinge commitment for religious believers. Commitment to God’s
existence constitutes part of a religious believer’s framework for rational
evaluation. More specific religious beliefs, however, can be rationally evaluated inside this framework. Says Pritchard:
We should think of religious belief as also involving a hinge commitment
to the existence of God that is immune to rational evaluation. . . . Religious
belief involves a fundamental commitment to God’s existence which is both
highly stable from a psychological point of view, but which is also part of the
essential background to a wealth of further more specific religious beliefs
that the subject holds.11

And more recently:
The crux of the matter is that the basic religious convictions of one who has
faith will form part of that person’s hinge commitments, and hence will be
part of the bedrock against which rational evaluations are undertaken.12

Pritchard doesn’t make it explicit whether he takes quasi-fideism to characterize the situation of all, many, or merely some religious believers. Since
8
To be sure, Wittgenstein himself never applied the ideas in On Certainty to religious
belief. The fideism that is associated with his views on religious epistemology is inspired
by the posthumously published notes about Wittgenstein’s lectures on religious belief
(Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations).
9
What I present here is Pritchard’s rendering of hinge epistemology. There is some controversy about how best to construe the position. See Ranalli, “Deep Disagreements” for
discussion of its different guises.
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he writes without qualification about “religious believers,” “persons of
faith,” and “theists,” however, I will assume that he has at least the second
option in mind and perhaps even the first. Quasi-fideism is supposed to
be a default option for religious believers; it describes the epistemological
situation of a typical religious believer.
To unpack quasi-fideism further, I summarize it in three theses. First:
FRAMEWORK: The claim that God exists has framework status for
religious believers.
FRAMEWORK captures the faith-character of religious belief. Commitment to God’s existence is part of a framework in which other beliefs are
rationally evaluated. Specific religious beliefs thus presuppose it. This is
not some special feature of religious belief—there is no special pleading on
the part of the religious believer here. It is a general fact about our practices of rational evaluation, regardless of their domain. All our ordinary
beliefs about the world likewise presuppose hinge commitments which
cannot rationally be doubted, e.g., that there is an external world, that
every individual has biological parents, that cats do not grow on trees, etc.
This short list of hinge propositions might look like a ragtag bunch.
This raises the specter of epistemic relativism: the thesis that the positive epistemic status of beliefs (such as their rationality) depends on a
framework of norms that vary with local conceptual or cultural conditions
and lack universal validity and that there are no facts of the matter about
which of these norms are correct.13 Because the quasi-fideist is explicit
in seeking to avoid relativism,14 she ought to explain how it can be that
the view does not entail the possibility of incommensurable but equally
legitimate epistemic frameworks since it seems quite possible for people
to have incompatible but equally legitimate sets of hinge commitments.
Pritchard thinks the quasi-fideist can avoid this conclusion because, first
appearances notwithstanding, hinge commitments do have something in
common: “What all our hinge commitments express is our basic certainty
that we are not radically and fundamentally in error. Call this our über
hinge commitment.”15 For example, the fact that cats don’t grow on trees is
13

Baghramian and Carter, “Relativism.”

See Pritchard, “Epistemic Relativism,” “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism,” 156, “Faith
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Pritchard, “Faith and Reason,” 111; cf. also his “Epistemic Relativism.” The introduction
of this über hinge creates a tension in Pritchard’s construal of hinge epistemology. On the
one hand, the claim is that hinge commitments are partly constitutive of the framework for
rational evaluation and are, as such, arational and incapable of being supported by rational
reasons or grounds (see also below). On the other hand, they are supposed to follow from the
über hinge. But presumably, if the über hinge logically entails specific hinge commitments,
it provides a reason for them. After all, if recognized logical implication doesn’t provide reasons, nothing does. So either there really is only one hinge commitment—the über hinge—or
there is some unaccounted-for relation between the über hinge and specific hinge commitments that makes it false that the former is a reason for the latter. In what follows, I will
ignore this tension and continue to assume, like Pritchard, that both the über hinge and more
specific commitments can be hinges. Thanks to Emanuel Rutten for raising this point.
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fundamental to our grasp of biology and our basic understanding of what
the world is like. If they were to grow on trees, we would be radically and
fundamentally in error. Hence, it follows logically from the über hinge
that cats don’t grow on trees. Similarly for other outlandish possibilities
that go against our basic grasp on the world. What ultimately remains
fixed, then, is the über hinge, rather than various more specific hinge commitments which follow from the über hinge. The latter in fact do allow
for variability over time and between cultures. If, say, sinister future biotechnology will allow us to grow cats on trees, it would no longer be a
hinge commitment that they don’t since this wouldn’t violate our basic
understanding of what the world is like anymore and, hence, it would no
longer follow from the über hinge. The über hinge itself, however, would
stay in place. Hence, epistemic relativism isn’t a live threat.16
A second implication of the idea that something is a hinge commitment
is that it is arational:
ARATIONAL: The claim that God exists is an arational commitment.
Arationality is not irrationality. Hinge commitments do not have bad
credentials from the perspective of rationality; they “precede” or “stand
outside” rationality. According to ARATIONAL, a believer’s commitment
to God’s existence differs from her more specific religious beliefs. Beliefs
like “God has helped me” or “God loves all people” can be supported, criticized, or otherwise rationally evaluated—someone might point to biblical
passages or theological considerations—but belief in God itself is presupposed in all of this.
The idea of arationality can be further fleshed out by considering its
technical sense in Wittgenstein’s thought. For Wittgenstein, giving rational
grounds requires that grounds are more certain than the belief they are supposed to support. This is why hinge commitments are groundless: nothing
we might offer to support them will be as secure as those commitments
themselves. In fact, anything we offer would already presuppose those very
hinge commitments. This explains why Moore’s response to the sceptic fails
as a reply: Seeing that you have two hands isn’t more secure than your belief
that you do. To suggest that the former could rationally ground the latter
manifests confusion about the nature of rational grounding.17
ARATIONAL has it that the existence of God is a hinge commitment for
believers in this sense. ARATIONAL paves the way for a parity argument
in defense of religious belief. As far as rational grounding is concerned,
religious belief is in the same boat as ordinary belief, scientific belief,
16
A general discussion of whether Pritchard’s über hinge strategy can avoid epistemic
relativism successfully would lead us too far afield for present purposes, but see Carter,
“Epistemic Pluralism” for some worries.
17
Pritchard, “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism,” 149, “Faith and Reason,” 106. While hinge
commitments are rationally groundless, they are not arbitrary or optional. They are given
with our nature, “animal,” “swallowed down” as part of our worldview, and involve a kind
of primitive trust (“Faith and Reason,” 107).
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and other types of belief. They are all ultimately groundless in the sense
explained above. The objection that belief in God is ultimately without
grounds, then, is nothing against it because the same is true for our belief
in an external world and other hinge commitments. Religious belief has
no special problem.
Together with FRAMEWORK, ARATIONAL also accounts for the psychological and doxastic stability of belief in God alluded to above. Such
stability makes perfect sense if God’s existence is an arational hinge commitment that partly constitutes the framework for rational evaluation.
The third tenet of quasi-fideism is:
NON-BELIEF: Religious believers’ attitude vis-à-vis the claim that God
exists is not that of belief.
Hinge commitments aren’t beliefs, at least not of the sort that mainstream
epistemology is concerned with and that many take to be a component of
knowledge. Hinge commitments are non-optional, “visceral,” “animal.”
They involve “primitive trust,” are unresponsive to rational considerations, and are ‘swallowed down’ rather than acquired via rational
processes. All of this sets them apart from knowledge-apt (rational) belief.
Belief is, by its nature, a truth-directed mental state and is, as such, responsive to rational considerations.18
NON-BELIEF is the key to solving what Pritchard calls the “containment problem.”19 If a believer’s commitment to God’s existence is arational,
this threatens to infect all her religious beliefs because they all presuppose
the existence of God directly or indirectly. Or, in the other direction: if,
as quasi-fideism maintains, a believer’s specific religious beliefs can be
rationally grounded, then so should her commitment to God’s existence.
After all, a straightforward inference could take you from a rationally
grounded belief that, say, God loves you to the conclusion that God exists.
Rational support for the former belief ought to carry over to the latter, or
so it would seem. To put it in general terms: rational support for religious
belief, or lack thereof, seems difficult to contain.
The epistemologically sophisticated reader will have noticed that the
issue at stake here is the transmission of rational grounding.20 While everyone agrees that rational support transmits when people competently
reason their way from one belief to another, formulating a principle that
spells out the conditions under which this happens is far from easy. Fortunately, however, NON-BELIEF allows you to circumvent this difficult
18
Pritchard, “Faith and Reason,” 108. Pritchard thus takes NON-BELIEF to follow from
ARATIONAL. I think the two claims can nonetheless be considered separately. That hinge
commitments are immune from rational evaluation might imply that they aren’t beliefs, but
the reverse doesn’t hold: Attitudes that aren’t beliefs might nonetheless be subject to rational
evaluation.
19
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task entirely. It doesn’t matter what a correct transmission principle looks
like, the point is that it applies to beliefs. So hinge commitments cannot be
fed into it. Hence, the commitment that God exists cannot receive rational
support from more specific religious beliefs, nor does its lack of grounds
render other religious beliefs equally groundless. Not only is the containment problem pre-empted, everyone can also hold on to their favorite
transmission principle.
Having presented quasi-fideism’s key tenets and proclaimed attractions, I will now go on to criticize it.
3. FRAMEWORK and Epistemic Relativism
According to FRAMEWORK, the claim that God exists belongs to the
framework within which rational evaluation can take place for the religious person, but isn’t itself susceptible to such evaluation. I will argue that
this commits the quasi-fideist to epistemic relativism, i.e., the existence of
incompatible but equally acceptable frameworks for rational evaluation.21
On this understanding of epistemic relativism, it is possible for there to
be two agents who hold conflicting beliefs but are equally rational by the
standards of their respective epistemic frameworks, without there being
any rational means by which one might persuade the other. Now, one
might think that epistemic relativism is true, perhaps even an inevitable
part of the human condition. The problem is, however, that Pritchard explicitly claims that the quasi-fideist can avoid it. This is not the case, as I
will now show.
How does FRAMEWORK lead to epistemic relativism? For that, it suffices if there is a mirror image of FRAMEWORK for unbelievers:
ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK: The claim that God does not exist has
framework status for religious unbelievers.
Just as God’s existence can function as a hinge commitment for typical
believers, God’s non-existence can fulfill this role for at least some unbelievers.22 Given ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK, epistemic relativism follows
quickly. Imagine two subjects, Theist and Atheist, for whom God’s existence and non-existence respectively have framework status. They further
have conflicting beliefs about the origin of the universe. Theist believes
that God created the universe, Atheist doesn’t—she believes there is a
complete naturalistic explanation for its existence. It seems perfectly
possible for their beliefs to be equally rational within their respective
frameworks, assuming that both have competently evaluated the relevant
arguments, objections, and rebuttals relative to their frameworks. Hence,
we have epistemic relativism.
21
Baghramian and Carter, “Relativism”; cf. also Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge and Carter,
Metaepistemology and Relativism for development and discussion of this version of epistemic
relativism.
22
Note that ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK doesn’t need to hold for all unbelievers, or even
for many unbelievers. It suffices for my argument if it has this status for some atheists.
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ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK is plausible for two reasons. First, it follows
directly from parity considerations. If theists are granted the courtesy of
getting God’s existence as a hinge commitment, atheists should be treated
likewise. There are no obvious differences between God’s existence and
his non-existence that would bar the latter but not the former from having
framework status. Both are fundamental metaphysical claims about what
exists. Moreover, both have formidable philosophical arguments for and
against them and both have been held by many thoughtful, intelligent,
and well-informed people throughout the ages. Given that we’re thinking
about these commitments as arational, these considerations cannot give us
rational grounds for thinking that they can both be hinge commitments,
but at least they show that there is practical or social parity between the
two, which lends further support to ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK.23
Second, there is reason to think that God’s non-existence in fact functions as a hinge commitment for some atheists. It seems pretty clear that
belief in God’s non-existence is highly psychologically and doxastically
stable for convinced atheists, in the senses specified in the previous section for religious believers. They will not suspend it immediately when
they encounter a theistic argument or reports of religious experiences. If
someone were to do this, we would question whether she really was an
atheist in the first place. Atheistic belief can also be doxastically stable:
Commitment to atheism will function as a fulcrum by which other beliefs
are evaluated. Upon hearing about a theistic argument or religious experience, a convinced atheist will think it rational to believe that there must
be some problem with the argument or a fully naturalistic explanation
of the experience. The phenomena parallel the ones Pritchard pointed to
in support of the thought that God’s existence is a hinge commitment for
believers.
Some written avowals of atheistic commitments also fit the picture very
well. Thomas Nagel, for instance, once wrote:
I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the
most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It
isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my
belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t
want the universe to be like that.24

Presumably, someone who hopes God does not exist and does not want
him to exist, will not easily give up his commitment to God’s non-existence
and will actively seek to conform his beliefs to this basic atheistic tenet.
23
My argument applies specifically to the case of God’s existence and non-existence as
hinge commitments. I don’t rely on a general parity principle about hinge commitments to
the effect that, for any H, if H is a hinge commitment for some people, not-H can be a hinge
commitment for other people too. Such a general principle is implausible. For instance,
“there is an external world” plausibly functions as a hinge commitment for lots of people,
but there’s no reason to think that, therefore, “there is no external world” can also be a hinge
commitment. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this point.
24
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How then, one might wonder, does Pritchard think quasi-fideism avoids
epistemic relativism? In section 2, we noted that the general strategy of
Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology for avoiding relativism is to maintain
that, behind superficial temporal and contextual variation in specific hinge
commitments, there is a deeper and fixed commitment to an über hinge,
namely that we are not radically and fundamentally mistaken. Since the
various more specific hinge commitments are supposed to follow from
the über hinge, this preempts the possibility of different and incompatible
sets of hinge commitments. It is far from clear, however, that this strategy
wards off the more specific charge that quasi-fideism leads to relativism.
God’s existence (or non-existence) isn’t at all something that plausibly follows from the über hinge. Rather, it would seem that both God’s existence
and his non-existence are compatible with our being not radically and
fundamentally in error about the rest of the world.25 The simple observation that numerous knowledgeable and intelligent people disagree about
whether God exists, while there is not a hint of disagreement about other
paradigmatic hinge commitments, provides strong evidence for this. And
unless the quasi-fideist wants to defend the wildly implausible claim
that all atheists are thoroughly confused or mistaken about the logical
implications of the über hinge, it seems she, too, is forced to accept the
compatibility of God’s non-existence with the über hinge. But then my
earlier argument stands: Both God’s existence and his non-existence can
be hinge commitments and epistemic relativism ensues.
But isn’t there a sense in which religious believers are “radically and
fundamentally in error” if God doesn’t exist? After all, God’s existence
has fundamental metaphysical import, so to be mistaken about it is to be
fundamentally mistaken. That may well be right, but such metaphysical
fundamentality does not entail epistemological fundamentality of the
sort relevant to our discussion. God’s existence is not epistemologically
fundamental to all of our other, more mundane non-theological beliefs
about the world and ourselves in the way that claims like “there is an
external world” or “I have two hands” are. If we are to imagine ourselves
being mistaken about these latter claims, the basis of our epistemic selftrust would be overturned: we would have no grip anymore on which (if
any) of our faculties to trust, what to take as evidence for what, and how
to expand our rationally based beliefs. This is not what happens when we
consider God’s non-existence.
But, one might press further, perhaps I’m still being too cavalier about
this. Religious believers could insist that God’s existence really is epistemologically fundamental to their outlook, just like other hinge commitments
and hence does follow from their understanding of the über hinge. In
support of this line of thought, they could point out that, according to
25
My claim is that this is true in the actual world. Perhaps there are worlds in which
God’s existence is so fundamental to people’s outlook that it does follow plausibly from the
über hinge. An example might be a world in which Berkeley’s idealism is true and generally
known to be true. Thanks to Chris Ranalli for making me clarify this point.
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their religious outlook, an external world wouldn’t have existed if God
hadn’t created it nor would it continue to exist without his sustenance.
Theists who accept Plantinga’s proper functionalist epistemology26 or his
evolutionary argument against naturalism,27 moreover, will add that if
God didn’t exist, we couldn’t trust our cognitive faculties, so that, without
God, we become epistemologically unhinged.28 Hence, the commitment to
God’s existence really does infect most of what theists believe.
Now the proponent of quasi-fideism faces a dilemma. For note that this
objection builds a fair amount of sophisticated metaphysics and epistemology into the contents of the religious believer’s hinge commitment.
Notions like creation and sustenance may be part of an ordinary believer’s
understanding of God, but—taking it for granted that most people do not
contemplate the finer points of modal metaphysics—necessary existence
most likely isn’t, let alone the tenets of Plantingian epistemology. So the
dilemma is this: either the hinge commitment of God’s existence is metaphysically and epistemologically florid, or it isn’t.
Someone who takes the first horn faces two problems. First, hinge
commitments are supposed to be basic and uncontroversial claims about
the world and ourselves; things we cannot rationally doubt. Surely, this
is not the case for the metaphysical and epistemological baggage that is
now built into the claim that God exists. A cursory glance at the history
of theological and philosophical thinking reveals that the topics of divine
creation, sustenance, necessary existence, and proper functionalism are
the subjects of vehement controversy. Second, it is empirically implausible that many religious believers really are fundamentally committed
to all of this. Perhaps some philosophically sophisticated theists are, but
certainly not ordinary religious believers. But then epistemic relativism
again follows, for we now have different and incompatible versions of the
same hinge commitment among religious believers, which boils down to
having different and incompatible hinge commitments.
Someone who takes the second horn walks right back into the arms of
my earlier argument. If the claim that God exist is construed more modestly, i.e., without an extensive array of metaphysical and epistemological
implications, it just doesn’t follow from the über hinge.
FRAMEWORK leads to epistemic relativism. Anyone who thinks epistemic relativism is implausible and who was attracted to quasi-fideism
because it claims to avoid it, should thus reject quasi-fideism.

26

Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.

27

Beilby, Naturalism Defeated?; Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 307–350.

I’m ignoring a philosophical complication here. According to classical theism, God
exists necessarily. Imagining what would be true if he didn’t exist involves evaluating counterpossibles, which is notoriously tricky. If we cannot say much about the truth-values of
counterpossible claims, we cannot be very confident about what would be the case were God
not to exist and so the champion of quasi-fideism may be on thin ice here. Nonetheless, I’ll
grant that the claims I’m putting in the quasi-fideist’s mouth appear initially plausible.
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4. ARATIONAL and the Epistemology of Theistic Belief
A second tenet of quasi-fideism is that the commitment to God’s existence
is not subject to rational evaluation but precedes rationality. I will now
show that accepting ARATIONAL has highly counterintuitive consequences for how we ought to evaluate (a) the intellectual lives of religious
believers and unbelievers and (b) a number of influential projects from the
history of thinking about religious belief.
First, consider a moderately reflective ordinary believer, Sue. Suppose she grew up in a Christian family. In high school and college, she
acquainted herself with some of the arguments for and against God’s
existence and came to doubt whether God exists. Through conversations
with friends and mentors and by reading some philosophy of religion,
she became convinced that there are good replies to atheistic arguments
and that theistic arguments are in pretty decent shape, as far as philosophical arguments go. She regularly goes to church and experiences
God’s presence in the liturgy. Being the moderately reflective individual
she is, she sometimes considers the epistemic status of some of her beliefs (although not necessarily under this very description). Upon doing
so, she finds herself firmly believing both that God exists and that she
is rational in believing so. She considers that she has grounds for belief
in God—arguments, testimony, and experience—that she isn’t flouting
any intellectual duties, that many people she knows and trusts share her
belief, and that, qua epistemic qualities, her belief resembles many of her
other beliefs—for instance about the acceptability of various scientific theories or about what other people think—which she also considers wholly
rational.
This is a perfectly normal and common case of religious belief: Lots
of believers are like Sue. What’s more, Sue’s self-evaluation seems highly
compelling. But the quasi-fideist who subscribes to ARATIONAL must reject Sue’s self-assessment. For her to think that her belief in God is rational
is an error, because it is an arational hinge commitment. It is a serious
blow for a religious epistemology if it ascribes to most ordinary believers
a deep-seated confusion or error about their epistemic self-appraisals.29
Second, the same point holds a fortiori for all those intellectually sophisticated believers throughout the ages—theologians, philosophers,
scientists—who have argued for God’s existence or the rationality of belief
in God. Luminaries like Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas,
John Duns Scotus, René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel
Kant, William Paley, and many others, up to present-day figures such as
Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig, and Alexander

29
A parallel argument can be run for moderately reflective ordinary atheists. They, too,
would be making a category mistake in thinking that their commitment to God’s non-existence is rational. See Ranalli, “Revisionism” for an analogous criticism of Pritchard’s
construal of Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.
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Pruss are all confused or mistaken in thinking that their belief that God
exists is, or even could be, rational.30
The proponent of quasi-fideism, however, has to maintain that their
confusion runs even deeper, and extends to the meta-level of systematic thinking about belief and rationality—something which not many
ordinary believers typically engage in. Someone who subscribes to ARATIONAL is committed to a radical assessment of influential projects in
the history of religious epistemology. Traditional natural theology, i.e.,
“weighing arguments for and against God’s existence,”31 was a major
intellectual endeavor, to which most of the great philosophers and theologians of the past and several renowned scientists from the early modern
period until the nineteenth century devoted at least some of their time.
The quasi-fideist must judge that all of this was deeply confused, for it is
impossible to give rational arguments for or against hinge commitments.
Natural theology is tilting at windmills. Pretty much the same holds for
everyone who has contributed to the development of Reformed epistemology.32 The point of reformed epistemology is to show how belief in
God can be warranted (and justified and rational) for a typical believer,
without being based on arguments. The quasi-fideist must again hold
that the basic thrust of this project embodies a category mistake: since
God’s existence is a hinge commitment for the typical believer, rationality
doesn’t apply to it.
This is a significant cost for the quasi-fideist. She has to maintain that
large swathes of otherwise impressive thinkers have been confused or
mistaken. Perhaps committed Wittgensteinians won’t think much of this,
as they already believe that the history of philosophy is littered with pseudo-problems that need to be dissolved rather than resolved. For them, it
would not come as a surprise that the language of religious epistemology,

30
Again, a parallel point would hold (mutatis mutandis) for intellectually sophisticated
atheists. Insofar as quasi-fideism allows for atypical believers for whom God’s existence
doesn’t function as a hinge commitment (cf. section 2 above) but instead as a regular belief,
it is open to its proponents to suggest that quasi-fideism doesn’t capture the situation of
these intellectually sophisticated believers. In reply, this move appears ad hoc: What else
besides the desire to escape this objection is supposed to motivate the idea that belief in
God is not a hinge commitment for these theists? Moreover, the quasi-fideist must still
ascribe confusion to intellectually sophisticated believers: In so far as they take theistic
arguments to be of relevance to the epistemic situation of the typical believer, they are
mistaken.
31
Taliaferro, “The Project of Natural Theology,” 1. Likewise Alston, Perceiving God, 289:
“Natural theology is the enterprise of providing support for religious belief by starting with
premises that neither are nor presuppose any religious belief. We begin from the mere existence of the world, or the teleological order of the world, or the concept of God, and we
try to show that when we think through the implications of our starting point we are led to
recognize the existence of a being that possesses attributes sufficient to identify Him as God.”
Cf. also Chignell and Pereboom, “Natural Theology.”
32
Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality; Alston, Perceiving God; and Plantinga,
Warranted Christian Belief are the seminal works, but they have spawned a vast secondary
literature.
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too, has “gone on holiday.”33 But those of us who are trying to assess quasi-fideism without such prior commitments may well demur.
These costs might be worth it, though, if the benefits of ARATIONAL
offset them. I don’t think this is the case. The most important payoff is that
it allows you to make sense of the psychological and doxastic stability
of belief in God as discussed above.34 But while this is arguably a phenomenon that any religious epistemology should account for, there is no
reason to think that quasi-fideism outperforms the competition. Let me
hint at just two alternatives. The Reformed epistemologist proposes that
belief in God can enjoy strong positive epistemic status if it has been powerfully produced by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis.35 As a result,
belief in God will be very stable, not because it is an arational commitment, but because it has a significantly stronger epistemic status than, say,
atheistic arguments. Linda Zagzebski’s recent defense of rational religious
belief presents another live option.36 She provides an elaborate argument
that not only epistemic self-trust, but also epistemic trust in others is a
basic and inescapable requirement of rationality. She then employs this
argument to show how and why trust in a religious community or in religious authorities can be intimately connected with epistemic self-trust
and hence perfectly rational. If she’s right about this, we can explain the
remarkable stability of belief in God by noting that it is tied up with selftrust and therefore rationally inescapable.
In addition, there is an important mirror phenomenon that religious
epistemology should account for and that quasi-fideism does not handle
so well. Arguments may not play a major role in why people adopt or
abandon belief in God, but they are not irrelevant either. Atheists often
appeal to evil, divine hiddenness, or absence of evidence in justifying
their non-belief in God. Theists often mention the appearance of design,
the fact that something rather than nothing exists, or religious experience
to account for why they believe. Apart from inveterately dogmatic folks
on both ends of the spectrum, many people testify to having at least questioned their convictions in the face of rational arguments for or against
God’s existence. Neither side is insensitive to arguments. The point can be
brought into even sharper focus by comparing it to other hinge commitments. Philosophical arguments have never brought anybody to seriously
doubt the existence of an external world, save perhaps a few overly
enthusiastic philosophers. Arguments for skepticism or metaphysical anti-realism hardly get any real-life traction in comparison to arguments for
and against the existence of God. This is a problem for ARATIONAL: If
hinge commitments are supposed to be impervious to rational arguments,
33

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 38.

The arationality of hinge commitment perhaps also plays a role in deflecting undesirable applications of epistemic transmission principles. I’ll return to this in the next section.
34

35

Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.

36

Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, ch. 9.
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then it’s hard to explain why people would be moved even a bit by theistic or atheistic arguments. Perhaps the quasi-fideist can come up with
responses to this challenge, but on the face of it, quasi-fideism fails to save
the phenomena here.
In sum, ARATIONAL leads to radically revisionary evaluations of
the intellectual lives of believers and unbelievers and of some influential
large-scale projects in the history of thought. It doesn’t have exclusive
benefits and cannot easily account for the actual influence of theistic and
atheistic arguments. We should thus reject ARATIONAL and thereby quasi-fideism.
5. NON-BELIEF and Belief in God
The third tenet of quasi-fideism is that a religious believer’s attitude visà-vis the claim that God exists is not belief in the typical epistemologist’s
sense, but something else.37 I will argue that NON-BELIEF, too, fails.
First of all, Pritchard suggests that NON-BELIEF follows from ARATIONAL: Because hinge commitments aren’t susceptible to rational
evaluation, they aren’t proper beliefs.38 This means that the arguments
against ARATIONAL from the previous section also undermine NON-BELIEF. If I’m right that the claim that God exists is rationally evaluable,
then the support ARATIONAL might have lent to NON-BELIEF crumbles
and we have not yet been given a reason to think that a believer’s attitude
regarding God’s existence is not belief.
A second problem with NON-BELIEF is that religious language is littered with belief-talk. The expression “belief in God” and its cognates are
ubiquitous both in ordinary religious discourse and in official statements
of faith. Many ordinary theists will not hesitate for a moment to affirm
that they believe in God. “Religious believer” is the default way to describe
someone with religious commitments. Both the Apostles’ Creed and the
Nicene Creed, accepted by all major Western Christian denominations,
open by explicitly proclaiming belief in God.39 The first of the six articles
37
A quick caveat: as Pritchard rightly notes (“Faith and Reason,” 108n9), the notion
of belief itself might not pick out any one clearly delineated thing. Eliminitavists (e.g.,
Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism”) and interpretationists (Davidson, Inquiries; Dennett,
The Intentional Stance, “Real Patterns”) argue that “belief” doesn’t refer to anything at all but
is merely useful parlance. Others claim it is multiply ambiguous (Stevenson, “Six Levels”) or
vague (Schwitzgebel, “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account,” “A Dispositional Approach”).
Digging into these concerns would lead us too far astray. For present purposes, I assume that
that there is at least one fairly sharp concept of belief, which many of our run-of-the-mill
beliefs fall under and which epistemologists like to think about. NON-BELIEF then claims
that a religious believer’s attitude towards God’s existence does not fall under that concept
of belief, even though it might fall under one or more other concepts that also have some
plausible claim to the title of belief.
38
The assumption that rational evaluability is an essential feature of beliefs might be disputable, but since I suggested we bracket questions about the exact nature of (different kinds
of) beliefs, I’ll grant it here and assume that this is indeed a feature of the kind of belief under
discussion.
39
The Apostles’ Creed reads: “I believe in God, the Father almighty, Creator of heaven and
earth.” The Nicene Creed states: “We believe in one God, the Father almighty, Maker heaven
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of Islamic faith also is belief in God. And indeed surah 4:136 of the Quran
reads: “Whoever disbelieveth in God . . . , he verily wandered far stray.”
You might protest that belief in God should not be equated with believing that God exists. That is correct as far as it goes, but it doesn’t help
the defender of quasi-fideism. Although belief in X indeed involves more
than mere belief that X exists, the former does entail the latter. You cannot
believe in X unless you also believe (perhaps dispositionally) that X exists.40 To believe in something or someone is to have faith or trust that
it (s/he) is up to some task. But of course, no non-existing thing is up to
any task! This explains why we can believe in Roger Federer and trust
that he will win another grand slam title but cannot believe in Frodo and
have faith that he will get the ring of power to Mount Doom (except in
his fictional world). When theists avow their belief in God, then, they also
believe that God exists. The prima facie evidence of informal and formal
religious language speaks against NON-BELIEF.
The quasi-fideist could try to deflect this evidence by pointing out that
religious language was never meant to express anything in philosophically rigorous terms and that, therefore, it glosses over the philosophically
important distinction between a believer’s attitude vis-à-vis God’s existence (a hinge commitment) and that vis-à-vis more specific religious
propositions (ordinary belief). This response strikes me as question
begging. Believers use the word “belief” freely and indiscriminately to express both their attitude towards God’s existence as well as various more
specific religious propositions. Nothing in religious language or practice
suggests that the meaning of “belief” shifts from one case to the other. In
the absence of independent reasons to adopt NON-BELIEF, we shouldn’t
endorse the revisionary interpretation of the evidence that it necessitates.
A third strike against NON-BELIEF is the fact that believers’ commitment to God’s existence looks an awful lot like belief. On all accounts of
belief, having a belief involves having certain characteristic dispositions
to act and reason.41 On the traditional representational account, it furthermore requires having a mental representation of what you believe. For
instance, if I believe that there is an open bottle of wine in my kitchen, I
will be inclined to silently assert this to myself or out loud to others on
suitable occasions, I will be disposed to walk to the kitchen if I long for
a glass of wine, I will reason that I don’t need to open a new bottle, and
I might have an internal representation of the bottle in my mind. Exactly
parallel things hold for the average believer. She will assert to herself or in
public that God exists, she might act or refrain from acting in certain ways,
she might use the existence of God as a premise in her reasoning, and she
might have some sort of mental representation of God existing. We have
and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.”
40
Cf. De Ridder and Van Woudenberg, “Worshipping, Believing” for further discussion of
the relation between belief-in and belief-that.
41

See Schwitzgebel, “Belief” for an overview of different accounts of belief.
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good reason, then, to conclude that the typical religious person indeed
believes that God exists.
The quasi-fideist might retort by suggesting that these considerations
do not tell against her proposal because she already admitted that hinge
commitments are similar to ordinary beliefs in many respects. However,
they are crucially different in others. This was the point of ARATIONAL.
Because commitment to God’s existence lacks the feature of being rationally evaluable, it cannot be a belief. That proposal failed, however, and
so we don’t know in what way a believer’s attitude vis-à-vis God’s existence is supposed to be different from that of belief. Until this has been
explained, we should take appearances at face value.42
Fourth and finally, let’s consider whether the work that NON-BELIEF
was supposed to do might offer independent reason to accept it after all.
If NON-BELIEF solves a pressing problem for the rationality of religious
belief, this could compensate for its revisionary interpretation of religious
language. Its theoretical fertility could offer strong circumstantial evidence
of its correctness, even if—as we just saw—the direct evidence speaks
against it. Recall that NON-BELIEF was the key to solving the “containment problem.” If commitment to God’s existence isn’t rationally based,
don’t all specific religious beliefs become arational, since they presuppose
God’s existence? NON-BELIEF solved this problem by denying that commitment to God’s existence is a proper belief. Hence it cannot be fed into the
epistemic transmission principles that generate the containment problem.
In spite of its cleverness, I think that this is a solution not worth
wanting. Far from being a genuine problem, the containment problem
correctly highlights that belief in God and more specific religious beliefs
are in the same boat as far as rational basing is concerned. If belief in God
can be rational, so can more specific religious beliefs. If it cannot, neither
can more specific religious beliefs. Let’s ask ourselves whether someone
could really believe rationally that, say, God loves her while lacking any
rational basis for her commitment to God’s existence.Consider how a
self-professed quasi-fideist should describe her own situation: “I have
good reasons to believe that God loves me but I don’t have any reasons to
think that he exists.”43 At the very least, this sounds paradoxical.44 The fact
42
As Chris Ranalli pointed out to me, the quasi-fideist could reply to this argument by
proposing that hinge commitments should be likened to faith. Perhaps having faith in God’s
existence entails a willingness to use God’s existence in one’s practical reasoning but not in
one’s theoretical reasoning. This an intriguing suggestion, but evaluating it would require
more extensive discussion of the attitude of faith and its relation to that of belief, for which
space is lacking here. See Howard-Snyder, “Does Faith Entail Belief?,” “Three Arguments”;
Rettler, “Analysis of Faith”; Ichikawa, “Faith and Epistemology” for recent discussion.
43
Reformulations that stay closer to the quasi-fideist’s preferred terminology don’t remove
the sense of paradox either. Cf: “My belief that God loves me is rational, but my commitment
to his existence is arational.” Or: “I have good reasons to think God loves me but cannot
provide any reasons / grounds / rational support for my commitment to his existence.”
44
For further support, note that quasi-fideism licenses (a) utterances that seem Moore-paradoxical: “God loves me, but I don’t have any reason to believe God exists” and (b) utterances
that look like abominable conjunctions in Keith DeRose’s sense (DeRose, “Solving the Skep-
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that NON-BELIEF allows for this possibility, then, actually counts against
it. Instead of accepting NON-BELIEF, we should say belief in God is what
it appears to be, i.e. belief, hang on to whatever epistemic transmission
principle we find plausible, and thereby accept that the presence (or absence) of rational support for general theistic belief transmits to specific
religious beliefs and vice versa.
You might object that this criticism is too general and too quick. It
affects all forms of Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and thus rashly
rules out a potentially promising solution to general skepticism. Consider
that a parallel utterance concerned with external world skepticism sounds
equally problematic: “I have good reasons to believe that there is a tree in
front of me, but I don’t have any reasons to think that there is an external
world.” The hinge epistemologist may grant that this sounds paradoxical but will add that this is because language can be deceptive. Besides,
having a feasible solution to skepticism is no small feat, so we should just
learn to live with it.
This companions in guilt defense won’t work, however, for anti-skeptical belief and religious belief are crucially different, as we have noted
repeatedly above. We’re much more confident that it is rational to believe
that there is a tree in front of us when we see one than we are that it is, or
can be, rational to believe that God exists. This is evidenced by the fact that
there is virtually no serious debate about the former but plenty about the
latter. It is also witnessed by the fact that most epistemologists consider it a
desideratum for an acceptable theory of knowledge or rational belief that
it renders radical skepticism false,45 whereas few, if any, would maintain
that a theory of knowledge or rationality automatically fails if it cannot
account for rational belief in God. So the idea that you have no reasons for
your commitment that there is an external world—understood in the Wittgensteinian sense as meaning that nothing we might offer in support is as
certain as that commitment itself—certainly has some initial plausibility.
Not so for commitment to God’s existence: it’s not as if nothing a believer
might offer in support of the claim that God exists will be as certain as
that claim itself. Someone might be much more confident that she experienced, say, a deep sense of being loved by something transcendent, than
she is that God exists. Or a natural theologian might be more confident of
the premises of a cosmological argument than of its conclusion.46 So my
criticism of quasi-fideism doesn’t overgeneralize: Someone could accept a
Wittgensteinian response to general skepticism but refuse to take onboard
its quasi-fideistic extension.
tical Problem”): “I have good reasons to believe that God loves me, but I don’t have any
reasons to deny God’s non-existence.” Thanks to Chris Ranalli for pointing this out.
45

Cf. Bonjour, Epistemology; Lemos, An Introduction; Pritchard, What Is This Thing.

And note that something similar would be true for atheists for whom God’s non-existence would be a hinge commitment. They, too, might be much more confident that they
have never experienced God, or that religious experience can be explained naturalistically,
than that God doesn’t exist. The hinge model thus doesn’t quite fit the atheistic case, either.
46
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Summing up: we should not believe NON-BELIEF. ARATIONAL offers
no support for it, it flies in the face of the direct evidence against it from
religious language and practice, and it is of no good theoretical use.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that all three of quasi-fideism’s key tenets are untenable.
FRAMEWORK leads directly to epistemic relativism. ARATIONAL violates the phenomenology of religious life and systematic reflection on it
and doesn’t have any significant theoretical benefits. NON-BELIEF fails to
do justice to the evidence of religious language and practice, and the solution it offers to the containment problem is unattractive. My conclusion
will be obvious: quasi-fideism offers quasi-solutions to real problems in
religious epistemology.47
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
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